Many people find the notion of blending humans and nonhumans together to create animals whose brains are composed entirely of human brain cells disturbing. I argue that these moral qualms lack adequate justification. I consider a number of reasons for objecting to the creation of such chimeras and argue that none of these reasons withstand scrutiny. I argue that the only plausible objections to these chimeras would require that they possess morally significant properties that would be lacked by similar, non-chimeric (...) animals, but that there is no good reason to think this would be the case. (shrink)

Eines der wichtigsten Probleme in der Leibniz-Arnauld-Korrespondenz betrifft Gottes Freiheit, individuelle Substanzen nach seinem Willen zu erschaffen. Arnauld äußert sich besorgt darüber, daß Leibniz 'Theorie der vollständigen Begriffe in dieser Hinsicht keinen Raum für Gottes Freiheit zu lassen scheint. Ich behaupte, daß Leibniz Arnauld eine zweigeteilte Antwort anbietet, deren zweiter Zweig bislang unterschätzt worden ist. Ich werde zeigen, daß Leibniz' Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Entscheidungen Gottes von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist für den zweiten Zweig seiner Antwort an Arnauld. Außerdem kann (...) diese Unterscheidung helfen, Leibniz' Lehre von der unendlichen Analyse zu verstehen und zudem verdeutlichen, inwiefern nach Leibniz' Ansicht Gott nun in der Lage ist, individuelle Substanzen begrifflich getrennt voneinander zu betrachten - was eine Schwierigkeit zu sein scheint, wenn von der Theorie vollständiger Begriffe ausgegangen wird. (shrink)

Part of the kalam cosmological argument draws upon the claim that an actual infinite cannot exist. Classical theists also maintain both that some individuals will earn eternal life and that God infallibly foreknows the future. The claim that these latter two theses do not require that an actual infinite exists because God possesses an intuitive, rather than propositional intellect, is examined and rejected. Although the future is potential, rather than actual, classical theism requires that the future be, in a sense, (...) actually infinite. (shrink)

“The Range of Leibnizian Compatibilism” Leibniz is generally regarded as a compatibilist, holding that an individual can be determined and also act freely. However, some Leibnizian texts suggest that perhaps Leibniz also had incompatibilist tendencies; in particular, Leibniz could not entirely give up the thesis that free individuals must have the ability to act in ways other than they actually do. I identify several varieties of deterministic threat to freedom and examine Leibniz's views with respect to them. Leibniz must find (...) room in his metaphysics for compatibilism not only with respect to human freedom, but also for divine freedom. There are asymmetries in his accounts of human and divine freedom that make it easier for Leibniz to accommodate compatibilism for God than for humans. (shrink)

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. (...) In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West. (shrink)

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition (...) while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe. (shrink)

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. (...) In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West. (shrink)

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. (...) In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West. (shrink)

It is a classical result of Mortimer that $L^2$ , first-order logic with two variables, is decidable for satisfiability. We show that going beyond $L^2$ by adding any one of the following leads to an undecidable logic:– very weak forms of recursion, viz.¶(i) transitive closure operations¶(ii) (restricted) monadic fixed-point operations¶– weak access to cardinalities, through the Härtig (or equicardinality) quantifier¶– a choice construct known as Hilbert's $\epsilon$ -operator.In fact all these extensions of $L^2$ prove to be undecidable both for satisfiability, (...) and for satisfiability in finite structures. Moreover most of them are hard for $\Sigma^1_1$ , the first level of the analytical hierachy, and thus have a much higher degree of undecidability than first-order logic. (shrink)

Résumé Si l’éthique formulée par Hans Jonas constitue un progrès de la conscience morale, qui peut ainsi s’armer pour répondre aux défis posés par la technique contemporaine, elle court cependant le risque de s’énoncer au détriment de l’impératif de progrès et de justice. C’est cette inquiétude qui conduit à instaurer ici un dialogue entre l’éfthique de la discussion de Karl-Otto Apel et l’impératif de responsabilité de Hans Jonas. Nous présentons l’éthique de Jonas, les objections que lui adresse Apel, les (...) réponses possibles à la lecture réductrice qu’il fait de la pensée jonassienne, tout en maintenant ce en quoi l’éthique de la discussion pourrait consolider les perspectives juridico-politiques envisagées par Jonas. (shrink)

Als Gegenbewegung gegen die spekulativen Höhenflüge des Idealismus einerseits, und den von vielen als philosophisch unbefriedigend empfundenen Positivismus andererseits entwickelte sich in Deutschland ab der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jh.s eine Bewegung »Zurück zu Kant!« – der Neukantianismus. In der deutschen Rechtsphilosophie wird häufig auf ihn Bezug genommen, ohne dass immer klar wäre, worin genau das spezifisch neukantianische Element einer bestimmten Position liegen soll. Der bekannteste Impulsgeber des Neukantianismus war Otto Liebmann, der in seinem mit jugendlichem Enthusiasmus geschriebenen Buch (...) Kant und die Epigonen die zeitgenössische Philosophie kritisch durchmusterte und jedes Kapitel mit der Mahnung »Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden!« abschloss. (shrink)

Cartwright’s self-proclaimed philosophical heritage includes Aristotle and Otto Neurath. Her Aristotelianism includes the view that the aim of science is the identification of the capacities of things in nature. From Neurath she takes a “patchwork” view of theories according to which theories do not fit into an unified whole in which higher-order sciences reduce, in some way, to lower-order sciences. Instead, theories work for particular kinds of phenomena and there is no guarantee that any theory will work outside of (...) those situations for which it was constructed. Cartwright maintains that theories and laws may provide true descriptions of the world, but no one theory or set of laws is universal. She argues that, since laws and theories are not universal, all laws are ceteris paribus. The achievement of science does not rest on knowledge of laws, but knowledge of the capacities that the things in the world possess. (shrink)

Here I consider the two most venerated arguments about the existence of God: the Ontological Argument and the Argument from Evil. The Ontological Argument purports to show that God’s nature guarantees that God exists. The Argument from Evil purports to show that God’s nature, combined with some plausible facts about the way the world is, guarantees (or is very compelling grounds for thinking) that God does not exist. Obviously, both arguments cannot be sound. But I argue here that they are (...) both unsound for the very same reason. (shrink)

There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic (...) idea is that an advisor and an advisee can together constitute a joint agent, and that this joint agent’s action can indeed have moral worth. So while the advisee himself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone he lacks the right reason), and while the advisor herself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone she does not do the right thing), they together do the right for the right reason. (shrink)

This Element introduces the philosophical literature on models, with an emphasis on normative considerations relevant to models for decision-making. Chapter 1 gives an overview of core questions in the philosophy of modeling. Chapter 2 examines the concept of model adequacy for purpose, using three examples of models from the atmospheric sciences to describe how this sort of adequacy is determined in practice. Chapter 3 explores the significance of using models that are not adequate for purpose, including the purpose of informing (...) public decisions. Chapter 4 provides a basic framework for values in modelling, using a case study to highlight the ethical challenges in building models for decision making. It concludes by establishing the need for strategies to manage value judgments in modelling, including the potential for public participation in the process. (shrink)

We review and present a new meta‐analysis of research suggesting that ethicists in the United States appear to behave no morally better overall than do non‐ethicist professors. Measures include: returning library books, peer evaluation of overall moral behavior, voting participation, courteous and discourteous behavior at conferences, replying to student emails, paying conference registration fees and disciplinary society dues, staying in touch with one's mother, charitable giving, organ and blood donation, vegetarianism, and honesty in responding to survey questions. One multi‐measure study (...) found ethicists tending to embrace more stringent moral views, especially about meat eating and charitable donation. The same multi‐measure study found ethicists and other professors to show similarly small‐to‐medium correlations between their expressed normative attitudes and their self‐reported or directly measured behavior. (shrink)

This paper argues that under some conditions, when one person acts on the direction of another person, the two of them thereby act together, and that this explains why both the director and the directee can be responsible for what is done. In other words, a director and a directee can be a joint agent, one whose members are responsible for what they together do. This is most clearly so when the directive is a command. But it is also sometimes (...) so when the directive is a bit of advice. (shrink)

In 1970 a coalition of student activists opposing the Vietnam War circulated documents revealing the involvement of several prominent social scientists in U.S. counterinsurgency activities in Thailand--activities that could cause harm to the people who were the subject of the scholars' research. The disclosure of these materials, which detailed meetings with the Agency for International Development and the Defense Department, prompted two members of the Ethics Committee of the American Anthropological Association to issue an unauthorized rebuke of the accused. Over (...) the next two years, the AAA agonized over the allegations and the appropriate response to them. Within an academic community already polarized by the war, political and professional acrimony reached unprecedented levels. Although the association ultimately passed a code of ethics, the key issues raised in the process were never fully resolved. Now back in print, Eric Wakin's Anthropology Goes to War is the first comprehensive study of what became known as the Thailand Controversy--and a timely reminder of a debate whose echoes may be heard in our own time. (shrink)

1. History of the philosophy of religion from Spinoza to the present day. 2 v.--2. Genetic-speculative philosophy of religion. 2 v.

Are philosophical arguments as effective as narratives in influencing charitable giving and attitudes toward it? In four experiments, we exposed online research participants to either philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, a narrative about a child whose life was improved by charitable donations, both the narrative and the argument, or a control text (a passage from a middle school physics text or a description of charitable organizations). Participants then expressed their attitudes toward charitable giving and were either asked how (...) much they would hypothetically donate if given $10 (Experiment 1) or told they had a 10% chance of winning $10 and given the opportunity to donate from their potential winnings (Experiments 2–4). Across the four experiments, participants in all of the narrative conditions and in some of the argument conditions tended to express more positive attitudes toward charitable giving and donated about $1 more on average than did participants in the control conditions. These effects appear to have been mediated by the “narrative transportation” scale, which suggests that appeals to donate can be effective if they engage participants’ emotions, imagery, and interest. (shrink)

" Ce général expérimenté nous parle avec une grande sagesse des qualités humaines et de la conscience nécessaires pour combattre l'ennemi et diriger les hommes. Ses pages m'ont surpris par leur limpidité et leur profondeur. Nous sommes bien loin de l'armée archaïque que j'ai connue dans ma jeunesse ", père Guy Gilbert. Ce livre s'adresse au jeune étudiant qui réfléchit à devenir officier. Aucun ouvrage, récent en tout cas, n 'avait encore pris ces jeunes et leurs parents pour cible, afin (...) de tenter de leur parler, avec des mots du début du 21e siècle, de la guerre et du terrorisme, mais aussi de morale et d'amitié, de courage et de volonté. Et d 'amour et de vertus, et de principes. Et de discipline et de sacrifice et de générosité, qu'il a en quantité à condition qu'on lui explique comment il va en faire le meilleur usage. Ses propos intéresseront aussi tous ceux qui, même en dehors des corps armés, s 'interrogent sur l'énigme de l'homme face à la violence. (shrink)

Justice, Sustainability, and Security not only enhances our knowledge of these issues, but it teases out our moral dimensions and offer prescriptions for how governments and global actors might craft their policies to better consider their effects on the global human condition.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky expressed a strange and surprising sentiment through one of the characters of The Brothers Karamazov. A dying young man named Markel declares: Every one of us has sinned against all men, and I more than others." He later says: "...every one of us is answerable for everyone else and for everything." Markel's absurd claims have engendered many reflections on the nature of suffering and what it means to be responsible for someone else's suffering. The world has no shortage (...) of pain and evil; what exactly is the relationship between suffering and responsibility? Markel's declarations press forward a question that drives this essay collection: how responsible should we consider ourselves for the suffering of the world? This volume is a collection of essays that struggle in various ways to understand and respond to several philosophical, theological and practical problems. In each case the authors grapple with issues surrounding suffering, immorality, evil, exploitation and oppression. The contributors share a clear concern for the ways that philosophers and theologians should respond to the problems of suffering and evil. They also share a conviction that these remain intense and central problems for philosophy and theology. Evil is an obstacle for belief, for morality, for hospitality, and for hope. This book struggles to address the particular and strong sense of responsibility that falls on Christians when it comes to understanding and, more importantly, responding to the problems of suffering and evil in the world. (shrink)

This is a book about Kant's views on causality as understood in their proper historical context. Specifically, Eric Watkins argues that a grasp of Leibnizian and anti-Leibnizian thought in eighteenth-century Germany helps one to see how the critical Kant argued for causal principles that have both metaphysical and epistemological elements. On this reading Kant's model of causality does not consist of events, but rather of substances endowed with causal powers that are exercised according to their natures and circumstances. This (...) innovative conception of Kant's view of causality casts a light on Kant's philosophical beliefs in general, such as his account of temporality, his explanation of the reconciliation of freedom and determinism, and his response to the skeptical arguments of Hume. (shrink)

This article provides a critical overview of competing theories of conceptual structure (definitional structure, probabilistic structure, theory structure), including the view that concepts have no structure (atomism). We argue that the explanatory demands that these different theories answer to are best accommodated by an organization in which concepts are taken to have atomic cores that are linked to differing types of conceptual structure.

Even though Kant’s theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) is central to his Critique of Pure Reason, it has rarely been asked what exactly Kant means by the term “cognition”. Against the widespread assumption that cognition (in the most relevant sense of that term) can be identified with knowledge or if not, that knowledge is at least a species of cognition, we argue that the concepts of cognition and knowledge in Kant are not only distinct, but even disjunct. To show this, we (...) first (I) investigate Kant’s explicit characterizations of the nature of cognition. As it turns out, he introduces several different notions that must be carefully distinguished before identifying the one that is central to his project in the first Critique. We then (II) consider the basic features of Kant’s conception of knowledge, indicating both how it involves assent and objective justification and how it relates to our contemporary conception. Next (III), we compare and contrast Kant’s understanding of cognition and his conception of knowledge in a way that allows us to present their fundamental differences and connections. We argue that while cognition, in the most relevant sense, is a species of representation that differs from other representations in that it involves the conceptual determination of a sensibly given object, knowledge (for Kant) is a kind of assent to a judgment that requires consciousness of a sufficient epistemic ground. Finally (IV), by appreciating the differences between cognition and knowledge, we explain several of the implications this conception of cognition has for some of Kant’s main claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. Among other things, we show how Kant can deny cognition of specific things in themselves while allowing philosophical knowledge about things in themselves in general (e.g. that they exist, are not in space and time, etc.). (shrink)

Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too Many (...) Candidates Problem’ . Given my formulation of the problem, it is evident that standard animalists are mistaken in believing that restricting composition is the only solution. I show that there is another option for solving the TMC. The advantage of such a position, which I call ‘unrestricted animalism’, is that it is compatible with unrestricted composition and the existence of brains and other proper parts of an organism. I conclude by sketching several strategies one can take regarding this latter solution to the TMC. (shrink)

kant’s critique of pure reason undertakes a systematic investigation of the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori so as to determine whether this kind of cognition is possible in the case of traditional metaphysics.1 While much scholarly attention has been devoted to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments as well as to that between the a priori and the a posteriori, less attention has been devoted to understanding exactly what cognition is for Kant. In particular, it is often insufficiently (...) clear what kind of mental state cognition is, what the exact nature of the conditions on cognition is, and how they are satisfied in the case of human beings. To bring greater clarity to... (shrink)

This book focuses on the unity, diversity, and centrality of the notion of law as it is employed in Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. Eric Watkins argues that, by thinking through a number of issues in various historical, scientific, and philosophical contexts over several decades, Kant is able to develop a univocal concept of law that can nonetheless be applied to a wide range of particular cases, despite the diverse demands that these contexts give rise to. In addition, Watkins (...) shows how Kant comes to view both the generic conception of law which he develops and its different particular instances as crucial components of his systematic philosophy as a whole. This volume's new and unified account of a major current running through Kant's work will be important for scholars interested in numerous aspects of his philosophy, from the theoretical and abstract to the practical and empirical. (shrink)